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People often make analytical errors when reasoning about scientific findings, affecting their 
ability to make well-informed decisions in everyday life.   A specific error often noted is making 
a causal claim from correlational evidence.   This study investigated the thought processes 
involved when students reason about causal claims found in news media reports.  What do 
students notice, or fail to notice, about causal claims in scientific studies? Can analytical thinking 
be improved by instruction clarifying the nature of causal versus correlational evidence? We 
examined changes in participants’ performance on a series of three questionnaires one week 
apart.  Each questionnaire asked students to critique a short media story about a scientific study 
by rating its quality and support for a causal claim, and then stating their reasons for their ratings.  
They were also given a second claim from an unrelated study and were asked to create diagrams 
depicting its possible causal relationships.  At the beginning of session 2, students received an 
instructional intervention that identified the correlational/causation error through an extended 
example with questions to elicit their thinking about alternative causes.  They then completed the 
same two measures with different stories both immediately and 1 week later.  The results showed 
improvement on both measures of students’ reasoning about causal relationships after the 
intervention, and that improvement was maintained one week later.  However, ratings of study 
quality did not follow this pattern.  The results suggest interventions aimed at the causation vs.  
correlation error in reasoning are successful even when set in a larger course context of learning 
about evaluating scientific claims. 
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Improving Causal Reasoning  
in a College Science Course 
       Accessibility of scientific information has never been better; as digital media has expanded, 
people have become regular consumers of scientific claims from research journals, television, 
magazines, blogs, or even word of mouth (Bromme & Goldman, 2014; Baram-Tsabari & 
Osbourne, 2015).  However, applying scientific findings in everyday life also requires an 
evaluation of the scientific claims presented.  To make well-informed decisions based on 
science, it is important for individuals to make distinctions between “good” science, “bad” 
science, appropriate claims, and pseudoscience (Kolsto, Bungum, Arnesen, Isnes, Kristensen, 
Mathiassen, & Ulvik, 2006; Trefil, 2008).  Media stories containing scientific claims often 
misrepresent, oversimplify, or overdramatize the implications of their findings (Bromme & 
Goldman, 2014).  Individuals must be able to understand scientific claims and limitations 
through “scientific literacy” skills (Durant, 1993, p.129), which imply “… an appreciation of the 
nature, aims, and general limitations of science, coupled with some understanding of more 
important scientific ideas” (Jenkins, 1994, p.5345).  This ability is integral when it comes to 
using scientific findings to guide decisions regarding health, behavior, and public policy (Kolsto 
et al., 2006; Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz, & Cook, 2012). 
       Because many media articles present scientific findings from an oversimplified perspective, 
people may not carefully consider casual explanations, and may inaccurately interpret scientific 
results (Bromme & Goldman, 2014; Stadtler, Scharrer, Brummernhenrich, & Bromme, 2013).  In 
addition, the reader may assume a source discussing science provides authoritative information 
no matter where it is encountered (Yeo & Tan, 2010), or assume needed information is simply 
omitted in the abbreviated media report.   Furthermore, the tendency to rely on one’s own 
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personal beliefs and experiences when considering scientific data is exacerbated by certain 
features of media stories, such as use of personal anecdotes.  Anecdotal evidence increases 
experiential thinking and decreases deep, analytic thinking (Rodriguez, Ng, & Shah, 2016; 
Rodriguez, Rhodes, Miller, & Shah, 2016).  While scientific claims are now readily available to 
the public, comprehension of such claims is still often challenging (Bromme & Goldman, 2014).                 
       Research has shown that students -- and even some trained scientific professionals -- make 
errors when reasoning about scientific evidence (Halpern, 1998).  These errors don’t apply only 
to students and professionals: More than 70% of American adults hold at least one 
pseudoscientific belief (Moore, 2005).  Furthermore, one-third of Americans think that evolution 
is “absolutely false,” and another 21% are unsure (Miller, Scott, & Okamoto, 2006).  Less than 
half of Americans believe that the world is billions of years old (Bishop, Thomas, Wood, & 
Gwon, 2010), and only about 30% of American adults are able to understand stories in the 
science section of the New York Times (Anelli, 2011).  While scientific reasoning skills are 
typically acquired through expository texts about natural science (Schwichow, Croker, 
Zimmerman, Höffler, & Härtig, 2016), similar scientific claims made in media articles require 
people to apply their reasoning skills wherever they arise.   
        Perhaps the most common error in causal reasoning involves theory-evidence coordination.  
A correlation (the evidence) between two variables does not imply causation (the theory), but 
people often interpret correlational findings as supporting causal claims (Burrage, 2008; 
Hatfield, Faunce, & Job, 2006; Rodriguez, Ng, & Shah, 2016; Rodriguez, Rhodes, Miller, & 
Shah, 2016).  When two variables A and B are correlated, the association may reflect one or more 
causal relationships between them: A causes B; B causes A; a third variable causes both A and 
B; it is bidirectional (A causes B and B causes A); or, the correlation may be spurious (without 
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any relationship) (Shah et al., 2017).  Unfortunately, people rarely generate alternate mechanisms 
for such causal alternatives even when explicitly asked to do so (Shah et al., 2017).   
        For example, consider this headline about a psychology study: “Smiling promotes 
longevity” (WorldHealth, 2010).  Without more information, what might a reader reasonably 
conclude? The headline appears to assert that smiling causes longevity.  How might smiling 
more cause a longer life span? While a causal mechanism between smiling more and living 
longer may not be evident, other possible causal relationships are.  Living longer would logically 
afford more opportunity to smile, and living a happy life might account for more of both smiling 
and years of life.  Generating these alternative causal relationships may help the reader recognize 
that the specific causal relationship is not sufficiently documented, and should be rejected.  In 
fact, the journal article describing the study is entitled, “Smile intensity in photographs predicts 
longevity” (Abel & Kruger, 2010), employed a keyword (predicts) reserved for correlation. 
        Alternatively, suppose the headline read, “Smiling promotes attractiveness.” In this case, 
smiling as the cause may be more plausible, and a third variable causing both appears 
implausible.  Further, an experimental study where people are assigned to either smile or not 
may identify the effect on attractiveness; indeed, this claim comes from an experimental study 
(Golle, Mast & Lobmaier, 2014).   While far from certain, it may be reasonable to conclude that 
this study may indeed support a causal claim.  Of course, reading the scientific article is the best 
way to evaluate the evidence provided; however, media reports rarely provide even a link to the 
journal.  In such cases, people are left on their own to consider the plausibility of a causal 
inference.  In everyday circumstances, people do apply causal reasoning to go “beyond the 
information given” to make their own conclusion (Waldmann, Hagmayer, & Blaisdell, 2006). 
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        Gaining skills to critically evaluate scientific evidence is a major goal of K-12 education 
(Lehrer & Schauble, 2006; Next Generation Science Standards (NGSS)).  However, teaching 
scientific content alone does not appear to improve students’ reasoning about science (Crowell & 
Schunn, 2016).  While Chinese students learn a more science content, research has shown that 
they perform equally to U.S. students on measurements of scientific reasoning (Crowell & 
Schunn, 2016).  Additionally, those taking at least eight college science classes did not 
outperform high school students on scientific reasoning tasks (Norris & Phillips, 1994; Norris, 
Phillips, & Korpan, 2003), though subsequent studies document a correlation between college 
science training and science evaluation skills (Amsel et al., 2008; Burrage, 2008; Huber & 
Kuncel, 2015; Kosonen & Winne, 1995; Norcross, Gerrity, & Hogan, 1993).   
        What skills do students need in order to understand scientific claims and to avoid errors in 
reason about causes? They must be able to identify threats to scientific validity (Anelli, 2011; 
Miller 1996, Picardi & Masick, 2013; Reis & Judd, 2000; Sagan, 1996a) and judge whether 
claims provide adequate support for a conclusion, referred to as theory-evidence coordination 
(Kuhn, Amsel, O'Loughlin, Schauble, Leadbeater, & Yotive, 1988).   In other words, providing 
individuals with more knowledge about how to critically evaluate scientific evidence does not 
guarantee that they’ll be able to apply those skills in everyday contexts (Shah, Michal, Ibrahim, 
Rhodes, & Rodriguez, 2017).  College students performed no better than 7th or 10th grade 
students when evaluating the validity of an experimental study; however, they performed better 
when explicitly asked think critically about the study (Kosonen & Winne, 1995; Rodriguez, Ng, 
& Shah, 2016; Rodriguez, Rhodes, Miller, & Shah, 2016).  It appears that people have the ability 
to engage in analytic thinking, but tend not to do so unless specifically prompted.   
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        One contributing factor may be that people generally engage in heuristic rather than analytic 
thinking, because it is easier.  Heuristic thinking is characterized as fast, frugal, automatic, 
emotional, and unconscious (Kahneman, 2011).  When analytic thinking is applied, individuals 
are more likely to recognize threats to scientific validity (Shah et al., 2017).  However, analytic 
thinking requires a substantial amount of effort, and due to limited cognitive resources, occurs 
less frequently than heuristic thinking (Shah et al., 2017).  Due to its ease, heuristic thinking can 
quickly lead people through tasks at hand, but often results in reasoning errors (Shah et al., 
2017).  Studies show that heuristic thinking is predominant in K-12 students, college students, 
and the lay public when reading media articles containing scientific content (Norris & Phillips, 
1994).   
        The ability to understand scientific claims and evaluate evidence appropriately may further 
be limited by personal beliefs, prior experiences, and emotional responses (Shah et al., 2017).  
When evidence “feels right” (often when congruent with one’s prior beliefs) or makes one feel 
good (because it is desired), people are more likely to judge the evidence as “high quality,” 
without considering other factors (Shah et al., 2017).  It is only when presented with information 
that goes against their existing beliefs that individuals stop engaging in heuristic thinking and 
begin to engage in more analytic, critical thinking (D. Evans, 2003; J. Evans, 2003; Evans & 
Curtis-Holmes, 2005; Klaczynski, 2000; Kunda, 1990; Sà, West, & Stanovich, 1999; Sinatra, 
Kienhues, & Hofer, 2014; Nickerson, 1998).   
        Understanding scientific findings may also be influenced by the presence of visualizations; 
for example, a scatterplot can alter the conclusions drawn from scientific evidence.  In one study, 
Ibrahim, Seifert, Adar, & Shah asked people to read about the safety of genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs) (2016).  Following information describing decades of research supporting the 
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conclusion that GMOs are safe, one fictional study reported a positive correlation.  The results 
showed that people were more likely to adopt the new evidence and make further causal 
inferences if a visualization was included (Ibrahim, Seifert, Adar, & Shah, 2016).  Other 
visualizations have also been shown to encourage adoption of new evidence, including bar 
graphs (Tal & Wansink, 2016), scientific formulas (Tal & Wansick, 2016), and neuroscience 
information (Rhodes, Rodriquez, & Shah, 2014).  These studies demonstrate how easily people 
can be swayed by presentation features without regard to merit (Shah et al., 2017).     
        However, visual explanations, when generated by the learner, can improve their ability to 
understand scientific data (Bobek & Tversky, 2016; Gobert & Clement, 1999; Ainsworth & 
Loizou, 2003).  Creating diagrams after reading scientific material has been linked with better 
understanding of causal and dynamic relationships (Gobert & Clement, 1999).  This suggests 
diagramming may motivate people to consider alternative causal relationships, a key to 
reasoning about causal claims in science.  Further, participants viewing diagrams generated more 
self-explanations (Ainsworth & Loizou, 2003) to explain the rationale of example solutions to 
themselves (Chi, 2000; Chi, Bassok, Lewis, Reimann, & Glaser, 1989).  Studies of example-
based instruction (Shafto, Goodman, & Griffiths, 2014; Van Gog & Rummel, 2010) show 
improvements in learning through spontaneous, prompted, and trained self-explanations of 
examples (Renkl, Stark, Gruber, & Mandl, 1998). 
        In addition, examples that are incorrect have been shown to be beneficial to learners, 
perhaps because they help them avoid these errors later (Siegler & Chen, 2008).  For example, 
Durkin and Rittle-Johnson (2012) found that studying common mathematical errors facilitated 
learning even for students with limited prior domain knowledge.  Students’ explanations during 
the intervention revealed that those in the incorrect condition more frequently discussed correct 
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concepts.  This suggests learning from examples of errors may be an effective intervention for 
supporting reasoning about causal relationships; because the theory-evidence coordination error 
is so prevalent, learning to recognize this error may show improvements in causal reasoning 
performance.  Other studies have shown that college students rarely notice this error when it 
occurs in others’ thinking (Burrage, 2008; Rodriguez, Ng, & Shah, 2016; Rodriguez, Rhodes, 
Miller, & Shah, 2016); if brought to their attention through instruction, learners may benefit from 
understanding why this error occurs so often.   
         The present study addresses this possibility by investigating whether causal reasoning in 
“everyday science” contexts can be improved through an extended example of the theory-
evidence coordination error.  By enhancing understanding of the error, and how to consider 
alternative causes, reasoning about future claims may be improved.  The intervention for the 
study (see Appendix A) describes an extended example of this error in a real-life context: In 20 
states, graduation requirements were raised to include Algebra II because a study showed 
Algebra II predicts college and work success (Carnevale, Strohl, & Smith, 2009).  This fits the 
pattern of an A causes B claim arising from correlational evidence, and alternative causal 
relationships are readily apparent.  As Anthony Carnevale said about the study, “The causal 
relationship is very, very weak.  Most people don’t use Algebra II in college, let alone in real 
life.  The state governments need to be careful with this” (Whoriskey, 2011). 
        To enhance learning through the intervention, additional support was provided by explicitly 
describing the error made (by legislators in this instance) (Große & Renkl, 2007) and providing 
an explanation about why certain causal inferences (A causes B) were not correct given the 
evidence (Stark, Kopp, & Fischer, 2011).  Further, following Berthold and Renkl (2009, 2010), 
prompts were inserted to encourage students to “work through” the reasoning about alternative 
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causal models.  Students were asked if specific alternative causes might account for the observed 
association between Algebra 2 and better jobs, including whether students already taking 
Algebra 2 were smarter, already headed to college, and in better high schools.  The learning 
outcomes may be superior if students receive help in this format where an instructional 
explanation asks learners to understand the theory-evidence correspondence error and participate 
in the causal reasoning steps required to assess the causal claim. 
        Finally, the intervention included a series of causal diagrams illustrating the multiple 
possible relationships related to the observed association. 
        The study examines understanding of “everyday” media articles referring to scientific 
studies; typically, a brief description of correlational evidence is presented along with a headline 
claiming a causal relationship:  
Although some people prefer to work in silence, many people opt to listen to 
music while working or studying.   A recent survey study was conducted at a large 
midwestern university that found that students who had listened to music while 
studying received higher test scores than those who didn’t.  The research team 
concluded that students who want to do well on exams should study while 
listening to music.   
        Understanding this story and its implications for a causal claim requires some knowledge 
about theory-evidence coordination, as well as causal reasoning skills to identify potential 
alternative theories.  Furthermore, the reader must also understand which claims are appropriate 
based upon assessing the type of evidence collected in the study (e.g., a test of association, an 
experimental design).  Critically, reasoners must know that only experimental designs can 
support claims of causal relationships between variables. 
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        The study was conducted in a college research methods course through a series of three in-
class sessions.  The pretest included a questionnaire with two measures of causal reasoning: a 
“study critique” task where a brief scientific report made a causal claim and students rated its 
appropriateness and explained their reasoning; and a “causal diagram” task where students 
generated causal diagrams for given a new A causes B claim.  Session 2 began with the 
intervention task, including the extended example of theory-evidence correspondence error, 
additional questions and visualizations to guide students in considering alternative causes, 
followed by the same two measures.  Finally, a posttest the following week again repeated the 
two measures.  We expected that the example and explanation of an important “correlation is 
causation” error would improve students’ ability to recognize and understand how correlational 
evidence corresponds to theoretical causes, and assist them in avoiding the theory-evidence 
coordination problem in their own reasoning when analyzing scientific claims.   
Method 
Participants 
        Students enrolled in a large midwestern university course on Psychology research methods 
were invited to participate in this study.  All students attending the course lecture for three 
consecutive weeks took part in the study.  Of the 258 enrolled, 97 (37%) completed all three and 
were included in the analysis.   
Materials 
        The two measures of causal reasoning -- Study Critique and Causal Diagram -- were 
included in each session as a repeated measure.  Hardcopy questionnaires were prepared with 
pretest, intervention, or posttest tasks.  Each task set included two problems selected from brief 
news reports of actual studies (see Appendix B).  In order to avoid item-specific effects, three 
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separate problem sets were created.  Each set contained one Study Critique problem and one 
Headline Diagram problem paired at random.  The three problem sets were then counterbalanced 
across students by assigning them at random to one of three alternate forms.  The three sets were 
designated by colored cover sheets (green, white, or yellow) to facilitate matching students with 
their form in each session.  A schematic illustrating the questionnaire content for each session is 
shown in Figure 1.   
Study Critique Task.  To assess students’ ability to evaluate a causal claim, a short media story 
(between 100-150 words) describing a study (see Appendix A) was presented followed by 
questions.  Two rating items assessed the perceived “quality” of the presented study and whether 
the findings “support the claim.” These questions used a 5 point Likert scale, with “1” indicating 
low-quality and an unsupported claim, and “5” indicating high-quality and a claim supported by 
the study.  Next, an open-ended question asked for “a critical evaluation of the study’s method 
and claims, and what was good and bad about it” (see Figure 2).  Examples of students’ critical 
evaluation responses are shown in Figure 3. 
Diagram Instructions.  A one-page sheet (see Figure 4) gave instructions with three examples 
of causal diagrams, and then asked students to draw their own diagram to show, “Hyperactivity 
causes a faster metabolism.” Ninety-eight percent of students completed this sheet with correct 
diagrams, suggesting they understood the instructions about how to make causal diagrams. 
Casual Diagram Task.  A second type of problem presented a short “headline” claim such as 
“Smiling increases longevity,” and asked students to “diagram possible relationships between 
variables suggested by” the news headline.  Two examples of the question with student answers 
are shown in Figure 5. 
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Intervention.  The intervention was a text-based guide to understanding causal claims through 
an extended example of a correlation/causation error in reasoning.  The example involved a news 
story about a link between taking advanced algebra courses in high school and later career 
earnings.  Lawmakers assumed this was a causal link, and now require all students in the state to 
take advanced algebra in high school.  Short exercises followed in a worksheet format to engage 
students in generating and considering alternative causes (see Appendix B).  The intervention 
booklet also presented alternative causal models for the observed association, and ended with 
written advice on considering a causal claim when correlational evidence is presented.  Several 
questions assessed self-rated understanding of the intervention content. 
Procedure 
        The study took place during lecture sessions for the advanced psychology course.  At the 
beginning of the lecture for each week of the study, students were asked to complete a 
questionnaire.  For session 1, participants were randomly assigned to one of three forms and 
asked to complete the questionnaire.  In the following week’s session, students were given the 
matching booklet (green, white, or yellow) from the first week.  In session 2, they completed the 
written intervention worksheet followed by the second questionnaire to assess changes in 
reasoning.  In the third week, students again received the appropriate booklet (green, white, or 
yellow) completed the posttest as a third repeated measure to document any improvements in 
understanding causal relationships.   
Measures 
        Ratings.  The two rating items indicated a correct assessment of the study quality and 
support measures (e.g., that the study is not of high quality and the results do not support the 
claim) through lower scores.  These two ratings were added together for each study critique 
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problem as a Ratings score ranging from 2 to 10.  An decrease in ratings over time reflect 
improved understanding of the problems with making causal claims from correlational data.   
        Reasons.  Students’ written responses in the open-ended study critique were qualitatively 
coded.  Six codes captured as emergent themes were scored as the Reasons measure: 1) 
correlation is not the same as causation; 2) other variables may potentially play a role in the 
observed correlation; 3) additional information is needed to make a causal claim; 4) the study 
describes a survey rather than an experiment; 5) the study was not a randomized controlled trial 
to establish causation; and 6) additional studies are needed to be conclusive about a causal claim.  
The more codes identified in the critique (out of six), the higher the score on the Reason variable.  
Two raters independently coded ten percent of the responses, and the percentage of agreement 
between scores was above 92 percent.  The first author then scored the remainder of the 
responses.    
        Themes.  The Themes measure captured how well students could generate their own 
alternative causal relationships between the variables.  The Causal Diagram task offered a text 
headline (e.g., “Breast-feeding increases intelligence”) asserting an A->B causal claim, and 
students illustrated possible causal relationships through one or more drawings linking variables.  
Responses were coded using deductive qualitative codes capturing separate causal themes: 1) a 
standard A -> B diagram; 2) a B -> A reverse direction diagram; 3) two or more variables shown 
to cause one other; 4) one “third variable” shown to cause changes in two or more other 
variables; 5) linked variables through multiple steps; and 6) connecting variables not stated in the 
claim. 
Two raters independently coded ten percent of the responses, and the percentage of 
agreement between coders was above 90 percent.  The first author then scored the remainder of 
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the responses.  A higher number of codes identified in a student’s response indicated more ability 
to generate alternative causal scenarios.  An increase in the ability to generate these diagrams 
over sessions reflects an increased ability to think about alternative causal explanations for an 
observed association between variables.   
Results 
        In this repeated-measures design, each student completed three different questionnaires, 
each including the same six test problems appearing in three different orders.  Approximately 
equal numbers of students completed each (n = 30, 32, 34).  A repeated measures analysis with 
Form (green, white, or yellow) as a between-groups factor found no main effects, with no 
significant differences for Ratings (F(2, 94) = 0.996, p = 0.373), Reasons (F(2, 93) = 2.64, p = 
0.08), or Themes (F(2, 93) = 1.84, p = 0.167).   No further comparisons were made by form 
groups. 
        Several questions within the intervention allow some determination of its success.  For 
example, when the intervention asked whether the example (incorrectly arguing causation from a 
correlation) is “convincing,” some students (35%) said, “yes,” and their stated reasons were 
wrong for 53% and partially correct for 42%.  This suggests seeing the initial example on the 
intervention resulted in the sense that the study should not be convincing; however, they were 
unable to articulate why.  Later, they indicate whether four alternative causes may be responsible 
for higher earnings instead of taking Algebra; of these, two alternative variables (“smarter” and 
“richer”) were endorsed as plausible by about half of the students, and about 75% endorsed two 
others (“better schools” and “headed to college anyway”).  Then, when three alternative causal 
diagrams are presented to illustrate other possible causes, over 75% answered correctly.  Based 
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on these measures, it appears most students assessed their own reasoning as understanding the 
intervention, and most were able to reason about alternatives to the stated causal claim. 
        A repeated measures ANOVA showed significant effects of Session (pre-test, intervention, 
and post-test) on causal reasoning as measured on all three dependent variables (Ratings, 
Reason, and Themes).  One measure of causal understanding from the Study Critique task is 
Ratings (ranging from 2 to 10), combining students’ assessment of the study’s quality and its 
support for a causal claim.   The ratings suggest a moderate level of understanding, with 34% 
giving it a low-quality rating (2 or 1 on the scale) at pre-test, 40% after the intervention, and 26% 
on the post-test.   
        The rating of support for the causal claim in the study was similarly midrange, with 48% 
correctly saying it was of low quality at the pre-test, 40% after the intervention, and 37% at the 
post-test.  This suggests the majority of students did not recognize the study’s evidence as a poor 
fit for a causal claim.  A planned linear contrast shows a significant change in Ratings scores 
over the three sessions, F(1, 94) = 7.27, p < 0.008, 2p = .072, with better performance at pre-test 
(M = 6.47, SD = 1.671) and intervention (M =6.397, SD = 1.732) than at post-test (M =7.01, SD 
= 1.636).  This linear trend in ratings is shown in Figure 6.   
        Rather than downgrading their ratings of the study’s quality and support for a causal claim, 
students increased their approval of the study over the three sessions (with high ratings = “poor 
quality”/ “good support for claim”).  On the pretest ratings, students averaged 6.47, above the 
midpoint of the twelve-point combined ratings scale, indicating they did consider the study to 
provide good support for a causal claim, and their support increased by the post-test.  The trend 
shows students were more accepting of the study’s quality and support for a causal claim at the 
end of the study.  One reason for this finding may be the rating scale: If students felt the 
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correlational study cannot support a causal claim, they should rate study quality as low (closer to 
“1”) and support for claim as, “not at all.”  It is possible that students felt confusion about how to 
assess “quality” in studies where other factors may play a role; for example, on the pre-test, 
students mentioned the sample size of the study, endorsements by doctors, specialized 
populations, and bias in respondents, all factors that may cause concern about a study, but are 
minor in comparison to the causal claim made.  Consequently, ratings of quality and support may 
increase across session because they are not adequate measures of knowledge for capturing 
reasoning about causal claims. 
        A second measure of causal understanding from the Study Critique task was Reasons, 
scored as a count of coded themes related to causality (range is 0 to 6).   The planned linear 
contrast indicating improvement in Reasons scores over the three sessions was significant, F(1, 
94) = 9.318.  p < 0.003, 2p =.090.  This qualitative measure reflects students’ concerns about the 
study’s correlational evidence as support for a causal claim.  This measure shows a substantial 
improvement from pretest (M = 1.25; SD = .854) to just after the intervention (M = 1.56, SD = 
.841), and this improvement is maintained a week later (M = 1.58, SD = .875).  These findings 
show an increased ability to discuss reasons related to theory-evidence correspondence in 
students’ open-ended responses critiquing the presented study.  In their own words, students 
increased the number of reasons related to the appropriate use of correlational evidence 
immediately after seeing the intervention material, and maintained their improvement on the 
post-test one week later.  (See Figure 7.) 
        The causal diagrams task allowed students to create their own representations of possible 
causal relationships for a stated, A causes B headline.  A planned linear contrast showed a 
significant increase in the number of causal relationships included in the diagram (F(1,93) = 
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30.935, p < 0.001, 2p =0.25) from pre-test (M = 1.68, SD = .985) to intervention (M =  2.44, SD 
= 1.429), and maintaining the gain at post-test (M = 2.40, SD = 1.469), as shown in Figure 8.  
The causal diagrams created by students show an increase in the number of causal themes 
evident in their diagrams (reverse causes, third variables, multiple diagrams), reflecting their 
increased ability to consider alternative causes for an observed correlation.  As with the causal 
reasons for the critiques, students maintained their gains in the post-test measure one week later. 
Discussion 
        The present study provides evidence about how well college students understand the 
requirements for making a causal claim from a correlational finding.  Following the intervention 
with an extended example of this error in session 2, students increased their use of causal 
reasoning in critiquing studies with correlational data, and increased the types of causal 
relationships represented in their diagrams of possible relationships between two variables.  
These findings suggest improved causal understanding was evident when examining the qualities 
of students’ alternative causal explanations for associations.  However, while rating scales of 
study quality and support for the causal claim show change over the sessions, this measure does 
not correspond to improvement in causal reasoning, suggesting confusion about what elements 
are critical to scientific quality.  These results show measures of causal reasoning can diverge 
based on how specifically causal concepts are referenced, with open-ended responses on two 
tasks indicating improvement over the sessions following the intervention.   
        Despite these reliable findings, an important result from the study is that the impact of the 
intervention (though statistically significant) is modest, adding on average less than one of six 
reasons (6%) for concerns about the study and less than one of six themes (12.5%) included in 
causal diagrams.  While students offered a wide range of alternative causal models in their 
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diagrams (as detailed in the six themes), their lower production of causal alternatives in the study 
suggests there is room for improvement in students’ performance, especially at the level of 
college courses.   
        Across the study, students simply did not write many causal reasons or alternative themes in 
their responses, and appeared to write a minimal response.  A low level of responses written may 
arise from the large-session administration of the measures in an (ungraded) class activity; 
consequently, students may have written progressively less over the sessions.  In support of this 
possibility, the number of diagrams created also decreased over sessions despite reliable 
increases in the quality of their causal alternatives identified.  While students did increase their 
correct use of causal understanding, they did not demonstrate a high degree of causal inference in 
their writing about each example study. 
        The ability to consider multiple causal models (as in the diagram task) demonstrates 
objective and creative thinking because students must posit additional variables (third variables 
not stated in the problem) and relationships (B causes A, multiple causes and multiple effects) in 
ways that frame the association as a pattern explainable by multiple causal relationships between 
the variables.  The findings show students were able to add their own potential causal 
relationships to their responses after the intervention, demonstrating the effectiveness of the 
intervention in increasing their understanding of causal relationships.   
        The study employed measures where causal reasoning is applied to specific descriptions of 
science studies and claims.  Applications of new knowledge outside the classroom may be less 
successful than direct measures of learning; for students, connecting classroom learning about 
correlations to the reasoning required to assess causal claims may be more challenging.  Some 
prior studies have found students can make use of statistical knowledge gained in a class when 
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asked about a principle through an unexpected phone call in another context (Fong, Krantz, & 
Nisbett, 1986).  More evidence is needed to show the benefits of this intervention extend to 
causal reasoning in the target contexts such as reading news media where science summaries are 
presented.  As a first step, this study demonstrated higher levels of performance on 
understanding causal claims within the classroom, providing a foundation for examining their 
spontaneous use of the learning in external settings.   
        As a classroom study, a major limitation is the attrition of students over three consecutive 
weeks of the study.  As attendance in lecture was optional, approximately a third of the enrolled 
students completed all three sessions, and no information is available about differences in this 
subsample compared to the larger class.  As the study continued through the three weeks, 
participants may have lost interest in the content of the study, resulting in less effort and lower 
completion over time.  This design was employed in order to demonstrate the effects of the 
intervention as long-lasting, maintained over a week until the posttest session.  Future studies 
may complete a pre-test, intervention, and post-test in just one session to examine the impact of 
interventions on immediate performance.   
        Students in the study are likely to represent able learners with a great deal of prior 
knowledge about experiments.  As psychology majors, their studies may have prepared them to 
benefit from the specific intervention employed.  While learning from error examples has been 
successful in other studies (Durkin & Rittle-Johnson, 2012; Siegler & Chen, 2008).  Future 
studies should include a more diverse population of students at varied levels of science learning 
experience to determine whether more novice learners can benefit from science instruction with 
this type of intervention, and include comparisons to objective measures of academic 
performance such as test scores.  As college students, the intervention materials may have been 
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easier to understand due to more experience in the classroom context.  For those not in college 
courses, the intervention helpful in this study may be less convincing or more difficult to 
understand.   
        The results from this study are promising in that students increased their consideration of 
alternative causal models when presented with correlated variables.  The error example in the 
intervention included state legislatures enacting laws based on a theory-evidence correspondence 
error; potentially, the example showing adults (who should know better) making the error may 
be especially helpful in students’ learning.  It is also possible this example was more meaningful 
for the students in the study as recent high school graduates in a state where the Algebra 2 
requirement was in place for them; in addition, other factors affecting their own interest in higher 
levels of mathematics may be more prominent based on their own experiences.  The success of 
this intervention suggests a strategy for instruction based on identifying causal reasoning errors 
that “hit close to home” as helpful in engaging causal reasoning. 
        The results confirm prior findings showing the use of visualizations can improve science 
learning.   As noted by Gobert & Clement, creating diagrams following reading scientific 
material has been linked with better understanding of the causal/dynamic aspects of the study 
(1999).  In the causal diagram task in our study, students were asked to create their own 
drawings of possible causal relationships underlying the A causes B claim.  Participants saw a 
model for how to diagram results in the intervention, and it had a positive effect on their later 
performance.  Models of reasoning provided by worked examples may be especially important in 
learning to reason about new problems (Renkl, Stark, Gruber, & Mandl, 1998).  Self-generated 
explanations encouraged during the intervention through visual explanations has been shown to 
improve learners’ ability to understand scientific data (Bobek & Tversky, 2016; Gobert & 
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Clement, 1999; Ainsworth & Loizou, 2003; Ibrahim et al., 2016; Tal & Wansink, 2016; Rhodes, 
Rodriquez, & Shah, 2014).    
        Studies of example-based instruction (Shafto, Goodman, & Griffiths, 2014; Van Gog & 
Rummel, 2010) show improvements in learning through spontaneous, prompted, and trained 
self-explanations of examples (Ainsworth & Loizou, 2003; Chi, 2000; Chi, Bassok, Lewis, 
Reimann, & Glaser, 1989).  In particular, the present study supports the role of examples 
illustrating error in learning to apply scientific reasoning.  While learning from error has been 
identified in other complex settings (e.g., Seifert & Hutchins, 1990), the notion of instructing 
students about common errors in reasoning about science may hold promise.  Because specific 
errors are well documented, teaching students about the error pattern – that making a causal 
claim from correlational data is in error, and explaining why – may be a helpful approach for 
other errors.  Because students may struggle to recognize the error when it occurs in the work of 
others or in their own work, it is important to provide experience with error recognition in order 
to build skills for error detection.  Further studies can extend this approach to science education 
by providing other instructional interventions based on common errors. 
        These results are also consistent with theories of cognitive processes in science education.  
For example, when asked to explain their reasons for why the study is convincing, students often 
invoked heuristic thinking in responses such as, “…because that’s what I’ve heard before” or 
“…because that makes sense to me.” As heuristic thinking is a quick alternative to careful, 
deliberate reasoning (Kahneman, 2011), students may easily gloss over the need to consider 
alternatives not stated in the problem or alternative relationships among the variables, leading to 
errors in reasoning (Shah et al., 2017).  Furthermore, analytic thinking requires a substantial 
amount of effort, and due to limited cognitive resources, occurs less frequently than heuristic 
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thinking (Shah et al., 2017).   When considering scientific evidence, and when seeing reports in 
congruence with previous beliefs, students often rate a study as being of high quality, as seen in 
our study.   
        The study has implications for teaching about correlational studies in the psychology 
classroom, along with other science settings.  Puzzling findings (such as the Algebra and salary 
association) may be helpful in encouraging people to think through other ways variables may be 
related.  Further evidence relating these qualities of examples to the impact of interventions are 
needed.  Often, the study described in a media report is more circumspect in its claims, but the 
media report highlights one possibility – the causal claim – over alternatives.  It may be possible 
to train people to watch for claims of this form, and then reason about alternatives without 
engaging in a study critique.  After all, the question of whether a correlational study is of “good 
quality” does not address its causal claim.  A more apt question is whether people see the causal 
claim as “supported by” the study; in addition to promoting causal understanding, intervention 
efforts must address people’s understanding of science studies.   
        This larger problem of assessing the quality of scientific studies is a more challenging 
agenda in science learning.  Science studies in varied areas may appear quite different from one 
another, especially in the short summaries provided in the media.  It appears to be unusual to find 
the needed information within a media article in order to recognize even whether the data were 
correlated or whether the study was a true experiment (with randomized assignment to groups).  
Only by engaging with a detailed description can a reader determine what support is offered by a 
given study for a causal claim.  In everyday science contexts, the goal for readers informed by 
science is not necessarily to track down the needed information; instead, causal reasoning is 
invoked in order to assess and appreciate alternative accounts of possible causal influences.  
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Reasoning “in a vacuum of information” is often required when partial information is available; 
while postponing an assessment until information is complete is not incorrect, in practice, 
reasoning about the potential meaning of an association is a key skill gained from the study of 
science. 
        Science is used to advance recommendations in a wide variety of areas, and causes are 
sometimes impossible to assess; for example, associations such as smoking and health risks are 
simply unethical to test in experimental studies.  Similarly, studies of child development 
differences are not experimental due to differences in families, gender, and other factors.  While 
many understand the basics of experiments in science, the point of an experiment – to identify a 
cause for an effect – may not be prominent in science education.  Addressing public science 
literacy may require changing the conversation to note that, “correlations are all around,” but 
only a small number of news reports reflect true causal claims identified through science.  That 
is, understanding the “base rate” for true causal claims may be important in raising skepticism 
about correlations, noting that the value of scientific enterprise may be inherent in the difficulty 
of establishing causal relationships.   The underlying problem for research on causal reasoning is 
helping people to recognize, question, and apply their knowledge of causal relationships 
whenever relevant in everyday life.  The present study provides some evidence for a small step 
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Figure 1.  Graphic depiction of questionnaire content for each of the three sessions.   
  





Figure 2.  Example of a media story with a causal claim and the two ratings (quality and support) 
questions. 
  







Figure 3.  Two examples of students’ critical evaluation responses; the top panel response 
suggests alternative causal factors not mentioned in the study, while the bottom emphasizes that 
a correlational finding is not indicative of a causal relationship. 
 





Figure 4.  Instructions for causal diagrams included several example diagrams.  The correct 











Figure 5.  Two examples of student responses to the headline Causal Diagram task.  The 
student’s response in the top panel depicts one causal relationship between the two variables, 
while the student’s response in the bottom panel includes three diagrams reflecting three 
different causal relationships. 
  






Figure 6.  Average combined quality and support ratings (ranging from 2 to 12) across sessions.   
  






























Intervention in Session 2 
Please read the following packet and answer the questions to the best of your ability as you 
go along.   
In 2006, researchers at Educational Testing Service (ETS) conducted an experiment in which 
they followed students for 12 years starting in 8th grade.  They found that 84% of the top-tier 
workers (receiving the highest pay) had taken Algebra II (or higher) classes in high school.   In 
contrast, only 50% of workers in the lowest-tier had taken Algebra II.   This result suggests that 
requiring students to take Algebra II would benefit all students and can prepare them for better 
jobs in the new Millennium.  Twenty states, including Michigan, have passed laws making 
Algebra II a graduation requirement for all of their high school students.    
● Does the ETS study convince you that taking Algebra II would be beneficial for students?  
Why or why not? 
● Do you think that requiring Algebra II based on the ETS study was a good decision for 
the state? Why or why not? 
The Algebra II requirement has now fallen out of favor in some states, and they are now 
reversing or watering down their Algebra II requirement.   In Michigan, students can now take a 
“Career Technical Education” course instead of Algebra II.   
● How do you think that no required Algebra II course will affect Michigan students’ 
career opportunities? 
Some people (and legislators) view the ETS study as proving that taking Algebra II causes 
students to have better chances of getting top-tier jobs.  That certainly seems plausible because 
having math skills should help you get a good job! 
● Why might taking Algebra II lead to students getting a better job?  
However, it is not necessarily true that taking Algebra II would lead directly to getting better 
jobs.   It is possible that the connection between Algebra II and higher job status is that the 
students who took Algebra II differed in other ways from people who did not.    
● In what ways might students in Algebra II differ from students who don’t take it? Who 
chooses to take Algebra II? Try to think of other differences that might lead some students 
towards top-tier jobs.  List at least 2 different things. 
1.   
2.   
• Think back to the ETS study, when students had to choose whether to take Algebra 2.  
Why would a high school student decide to take it, and why would a student decide not to take 
it? Try to think of at least one new reason a student would take it, and one reason not to take it. 
1.   
• Think about the reasons listed below, and judge whether each reason might also explain 
why algebra students end up in better jobs.  Mark each sentence with a “T” for true and and “F” 
for false based on whether you think it is a good reason. 
1. Students who chose Algebra II were also smarter, so they did well in school and ended 
up in better jobs. 
2. Students who chose Algebra II were also going to college, so they ended up in better 
jobs. 
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3. Students who chose Algebra II were from richer families who would help them with 
connections so they ended up in better jobs. 
4. Students who chose Algebra II went to better high schools (with more math classes), and 
therefore they ended up in better jobs. 
From the previous questions, notice that there are other reasons that students might both have 
taken Algebra II and gotten a top-tier job.  It might look like what the students learned in Algebra 
II helped them get good jobs, but it could have been one of these other reasons that was the real 
cause.   
The Michigan legislators seem to make a mistake in their decision making (as all people 
sometimes do) called the “correlation-to-causation” error.   Just because two things are related 
(like Algebra II and better jobs), you can’t decide that one causes the other.  Taking Algebra II 
and getting a good job may both be caused by something else; for example, being good in school 
or being in a good school, or having parents that are doctors.   This is called a third variable 
explanation, where two things “go together” because of some other (third) cause.   
Take a moment to pause and think: Most of us already know that “correlation does not imply 
causation;” but many times, especially when the cause makes sense, we forget to question our 
assumptions about causes.   
If any two variables A and B are related, it can mean one of several things: 
1.   It could mean that A causes B.    
2.  It could mean that B causes A.   
3.  It could mean that C causes both A and B.   
Or, A and B both can cause C.    It could be really complicated, in which A causes B which 
causes more A, and so on.  Or, that A causes B, but C also impacts B.   Whenever you evaluate 
evidence, it is important to think through these various options.   
  




Study Critique and Causal Diagram Tasks  
COMPUTERS-GLASSES 
A recent study funded by the National Institute of Health links extended computer use to an 
increase in glasses and contacts use.  Researchers recruited 600 employees from the NYC area and 
administered a survey on computer use.   Of the respondents who used the computer for 30+ hours 
a week, ⅔ wore corrective lenses or contacts and had severe myopia (nearsightedness) or hyperopia 
(farsightedness).  In contrast, people who did not use computers extensively at work were less 
likely to report wearing corrective lenses: Only 10% of people who used computers less than 30 
hours a week at their jobs required corrective lenses.  To avoid harming your eyes, the researchers 
recommend avoiding too many hours using a computer each day.   If it is impossible to avoid 
screen time on the job, they recommend speaking with an ophthalmologist about what you might 
do to counteract the negative consequences of screen time.   
 
SILENCE OR MUSIC 
Although some people prefer to work in silence, many people opt to listen to music while working 
or studying.  In fact, a brief glimpse into a library or coffee shop will reveal dozens of individuals 
poring over their laptops and books with earphones wedged into their ears.  Researchers have 
recently become interested in whether listening to music actually helps students pay attention and 
learn new information.  A recent study was conducted by researchers at a large midwestern 
university.   Students (n = 450) were surveyed prior to final exams in several large, lecture-based 
courses, and asked whether or not they had listened to music while studying for the final.   The 
students who listened to music had, on average, higher test scores than students who did not listen 
to music while studying.   The research team concluded that students who want to do well on their 
exams should listen to music while studying.   
 
PARENT-SELF CONTROL 
An important aspect of parenting is to help children develop their self-control skills.   
Developmental scientists have long been interested in how parenting practices impact children’s 
ability to make their own choices.  As part of a recent study, researchers measured children's body 
fat and surveyed mothers about the amount of control they exert over their children's eating.  The 
results of this study, conducted with 400 children aged 3 to 5, found that those with the most body 
fat had the most “controlling” mothers when it came to the amount of food eaten.  This shows that, 
“when mothers exert more control over their children's eating, the children display less self-
control,” researchers said.  Researchers recommend that parents should avoid being too 
controlling, and let their children learn to develop their own skills.   
 
CHURCH-HEALTH 
Now, please diagram possible relationships between variables suggested by this news headline: 
“Church attendance boosts immunity.” Be sure to label the circles and links in your diagrams.   
Then, write a caption below each diagram to describe the relationships. 
 
SMILING-LONGEVITY 
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Now, please diagram possible relationships between variables suggested by this news headline: 
“Sincere smiling promotes longevity.” Be sure to label the circles and links in your diagrams.   
Then, write a caption below each diagram to describe the relationships. 
 
CHURCH ATTENDANCE–IMMUNITY 
Now, please diagram possible relationships between variables suggested by this news headline: 
“Church attendance boosts immunity.” Be sure to label the circles and links in your diagrams.   
Then, write a caption below each diagram to describe the relationships. 
 
